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ABSTRACT
Within-country ethnic diversity in high-wage immigrant nations is driven by long distance
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Diversity and Migration: Setting the Stage 
 
Why do some parts of the world have much greater ethnic and cultural diversity 
than others?  
Let me begin by stating the obvious: ethnic diversity can only come about for one 
reason – long distance migration. Ceteris paribus, regions which have undergone greater 
immigration in the past will exhibit greater ethnic diversity in the present. The ceteris 
paribus qualification is essential since most observers only pay attention to immigration 
rates and foreign-born shares. Who the immigrants are and their ‘ethnic distance’ from 
the native-born matters just as much as the overall immigration rate; both dictate the size 
of the economic, cultural and linguistic diversity in the host country.
1 The interesting 
issue, then, is how the combination of immigrant ethnic diversity and the immigration 
rate work to forge the migration-diversity connection in the host country and whether 
there is an economic explanation for both.  
It seems to me that if we understand what determines who and how many migrate, 
then we understand what determines ethnic diversity. The most parsimonious explanation 
of migration, and thus of diversity, appeals simply to wage gaps between sending and 
receiving regions (Lucas 1988: 6). I call this demand side thinking. It tells us 
unambiguously that labor surplus regions -- which have, historically, always sent 
emigrants abroad -- will also be regions at the bottom of the real wage, living standard 
and GDP per capita pecking order. These poor parts of the world will also tend to be the 
least diverse since they do not pull in migrants. Symmetrically, it also tells us that labor 
                                                 
1 There is a very large literature that tries to measure within country ethnic diversity, or what I call here 
‘ethnic distance’, and a recent survey of it can be found in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).   4
scarce regions -- which have, historically, always received immigrants from abroad -- 
will be regions at the top of the real wage, living standard and GDP per capita pecking 
order.
2 They will also tend to be the most ethnically diverse. 
The foreign-born share in the advanced economies today is 8.7 percent and the 
share for the developing countries is 1.5 percent (Freeman 2006: 146), roughly 
confirming the prediction of the parsimonious model. Table 1 offers far more detail. The 
world population-weighted foreign-born ratio reported there is 2.98, but the range across 
major regions is huge: the two highest are Western Europe and North America (10.07, 
3.4 times the world average) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (8.24, 2.8 times the 
world average); the three lowest are East Asia (1.05), Latin America and the Caribbean 
(1.01), and South Asia (0.92). The high FB ratio for Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
may appear to be a surprise, but the explanation is simply that what had been internal 
migration in the USSR became external migration after the break up. The second surprise 
may appear to be sub-Saharan Africa, where the FB ratio is 3.66, but there has long been 
cross-border churning in that region (Hatton and Williamson 2002). Finally, while 
foreign-born shares of 10 percent may not sound like high levels of cultural and ethnic 
diversity, remember that the foreign-born concentrate in gateway cities. Thus, while the 
foreign-born share is ‘only’ 4.3 in the United Kingdom, it is 28 in London, a ratio of 
almost seven to one! Similarly, the share for Paris (23) is almost two and a half times that 
of France (10). Big multiples also apply to modern high-wage gateway cities in the US 
like Boston (FB share 30.1; multiple 30.1/11.1=2.7), Los Angeles (40.2; 3.6), Miami 
                                                 
2 One has to assume, of course, that the migration fails to eliminate wage differentials across countries. 
History confirms that assumption: whatever produced the wage gap in 1830 at the start of modern mass 
migration has persisted to the present. World migration has always been constrained, even during the age of 
‘free’ migration.   5
(58.2; 5.2), New York (35.5; 3.2), and San Francisco (35.5; 3.2).
3 The same was true, of 
course, for 19
th century Boston, Buenos Aires, New York, and São Paolo. 
Figure 1 illustrates the parsimonious demand-side model with foreign-born shares 
(FB) plotted against GDP per capita, both for the year 2000, and covering 130 countries.
4 
When FB is regressed against GDP per capita (Table 1) – controlling only for country 
size (area) -- the estimated coefficient is 0.294 with a t-statistic of 3.84. This world 
relationship is robust to the addition of geography and other controls (not reported here). 
But the big surprise in Table 1 is this: while the parsimonious relationship works very 
well in explaining world migration, it does not work very well in explaining migration 
within regions (with the exceptions of East Asia and Latin America). The moral seems 
clear: While the parsimonious model is effective in explaining long distance migration 
between rich and poor regions (between which ethnic distance is greatest), a more 
complex model is needed to explain migration within regions where income per capita 
variance is so much smaller (as are ethnic distances).  
 The parsimonious demand-side model may work well in accounting for world 
variance in foreign-born shares, but it fails to take account of a force which has a 
powerful influence on ethnic diversity among the foreign-born. The migration of the poor 
has always been constrained on the supply side by poverty (Faini and Venturini 1994; 
Hatton and Williamson 1998, 2005), the cost of long distance moves, and the population 
share in the mobile age group. These supply constraints interfere with what otherwise 
                                                 
3 The source of the US city 2003 FB shares is online at 
www.census.gov/acs/www/Products/Ranking/2003/R15T160.htm  
4 The source of the GDP per capita 2000 data is the Penn World Tables online at  
www.pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt61_form.php 
and the source of the Foreign Born 2000 data is the United Nations online 
www.un.org/population/publications/ittmig2002/WEB_migration_wallchart.ls.   6
might produce a perfect correlation between living standards, immigration and ethnic 
diversity, with the causal direction going from living standards to migration to diversity.
5 
In fact, ever since ‘free’ mass migration started two centuries ago it has always been true 
that the richer of the poor regions, and the richer within poor regions, are the first to make 
the long distance move to the richest regions. Thus, while the United States had a lot of 
foreign-born in 1820 – before the big secular migration boom that started in the 1840s, 
most were ethnically, culturally and linguistically almost identical to the native-born. 
That is, new British and German immigrants joined old British and German immigrants. 
Similarly, new Italian and Spanish immigrants joined old Italian and Spanish immigrants 
in 19
th century Argentina, new Italian and Portuguese immigrants joined the old in 19
th 
century Brazil, and new United Kingdom immigrants joined the old in Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand. Only as the poverty trap was unlocked in poor European countries, as 
a glut of young adults emerged in those same countries as they underwent demographic 
transitions, and as the cost of long distance travel between the poor sending and rich host 
countries fell, only then did the ethnic gap between immigrant and native-born rise and 
diversity increase in the overseas host countries. 
 
The Emigration Life Cycle 
 
About 60 million Europeans set sail for the labor scarce New World in the century 
following 1820. Most moved to escape European poverty. European famine, revolution 
and ethnic cleansing certainly helped push the first great mass migrations, but it was 
                                                 
5 Most of the economics literature has looked instead at the impact of ethnic diversity on public goods and 
economic growth (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2003). This seems 
unwise given that ethnic diversity is determined endogenously by migration.   7
underlying economic and demographic labor market fundamentals that made each 
subsequent surge bigger than the previous up to World War I. If my only purpose was to 
explain why so many Europeans emigrated in the first global century, this section would 
be very brief: after all, living standards were a lot lower in labor abundant European 
sending countries. But why did emigrating countries trace out the life cycle pattern in 
Figure 2? That is, emigration rates typically rose steeply from low levels (A: where 
emigration rates e0 are zero and wages low at w0) as successful economic development 
took place in poor sending countries, after which the rise began to slow down, emigration 
rates reached a peak (B: e1 and w1), and subsequently fell off (C: e2 and w2). This 
emigration life-cycle has been documented again and again for the first global century 
before 1914.
6 What accounts for this stylized fact? 
Figure 3 contains the explanation (documented in Hatton and Williamson 1998, 
2005), where movements along some downward-sloping home country emigration 
function (EM) are distinguished from shifts in the EM function. The EM function is 
downward sloping for the usual reasons: ceteris paribus, higher wages at home retain 
workers and produce lower emigration rates. But what about the ceteris paribus, violated 
here by rightward shifts in the EM function? In pre-industrial episodes, small or even 
nonexistent emigration rates (e0 = 0, at A) and low wages (w0) co-exist, that is, those who 
have the most to gain from a move are trapped in poverty. Industrialization and other 
events then serve to shift the emigration function rightward to EM' and to raise real 
wages to w1. The shift in EM dominates in this example since emigration rates have risen 
to e1 (at B); in the absence of the shift in EM, emigration rates would have fallen to e1' 
                                                 
6 Economists obsessed with contemporary cross sections have noted that fast growth is often, but not 
always, correlated with emigration rates (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2003; Freeman 2006: 160), 
inferring that emigration can foster growth. Figures 2 and 3 suggest that they have the causation wrong.   8
(where, in this example, they actually would have become immigration rates, at B’). In 
later stages of development, EM is more stable so that further improvements in real 
wages at home, to w2, cut back emigration rates to e2 (at C). Thus, the emigration life-
cycle in Figure 2 is reproduced in Figure 3: starting at low wages and no emigration at A, 
emigration booms in the poor but developing country to B, then falls to C, and finally 
becomes a high-wage immigrating country at D.  
  What, then, might account for the rightward shifts in EM during early 
industrialization and its stability (or even leftward shift) thereafter? The first explanation 
appeals to the cost of migration and imperfect capital markets. Although there may be a 
strong incentive to flee pre-industrial poverty and rural subsistence, the costs of a long 
distance move are prohibitive for most poor laborers. Thus, enormous and historically 
persistent wage gaps between industrializing, resource-rich, high-wage countries and 
agrarian, resource-poor, low-wage countries are quite consistent with low emigration 
rates. As industrialization takes place in the poor sending countries, real wages rise and 
the supply constraints on emigration are gradually released: more and more potential 
emigrants can finance the move, and, in contrast with conventional theory, the home 
wage and emigration are positively correlated. As industrialization continues, the backlog 
of potential emigrants is slowly exhausted as more and more workers find ways to 
finance the move.
7 The demographic transition adds to that rightward shift in EM: the fall 
in infant mortality rates tends, after a 15 or 20 year lag, to create a fatter cohort of mobile 
young adults, thus contributing even more to the emigration boom. In addition, 
remittances from previous emigrants help finance the move of family left behind (the 
                                                 
7 A young mobile cohort may also age before emigration conditions improve, thus helping deplete the 
backlog of potential emigrants.   9
friends and relatives effect). As a final contribution to the rightward shift in EM, the cost 
of long distance migration fell steeply before 1914 (Shah Mohammed and Williamson 
2004). When the demographic transition reaches a crescendo, when remittances level off, 
when industrialization at home has released the migration cost constraint, and when the 
cost of long distance migration ceases its fall, the rightward shift in EM stops and begins 
to drift inwards to the left. Further increases in the sending country real wage causes the 
emigration rate to decline from the peak and the emigration life cycle is complete. The 
length of a country’s emigration life cycle varied with the intensity of the industrial 
revolution and demographic transition at home, but 50 years was the typical length in the 
first global century before 1914. The emigration life cycle is shorter today since the 
demographic transitions and the industrial revolutions are faster and shorter. This 
contrasting length in the emigration life cycle is likely to have made ethnic diversity rise 
more steeply to higher levels before 1914 than after 1950. The shorter length of the 
emigration life cycle implies fewer regions emigrating at any given time. 
  In summary, emigration histories typically pass through two regimes, the first 
emigrant supply constrained, and the second emigrant demand constrained. The 
emigrant-supply-constrained EM regime was consistent with the rising emigration and 
rising home wages since powerful rightward shifts in EM dominated. But at some point, 
home wages were high enough so that financial constraints were less binding: further 
increases in the home wage (relative to the foreign wage) then served to reduce the 
emigration incentive, the emigration rate fell as the economy moved up a more stable EM 
function, and emigration experience entered the demand-constrained regime. Emigration   10
rates then fell as now-more-economically-mature sending regions began to catch up with 
the richer receiving regions. 
 
Migration and Ethnic Diversity: The First US Global Century 
 
  The emigrant life cycle is consistent with conventional qualitative histories of the 
first global century. It implied an evolving change in immigrant source, quality and 
ethnic distance (from the native-born norm) through time. As the transport revolution 
unfolded between 1820 and 1913, the cost of long distance moves declined dramatically 
in terms of railroad fare to port, steerage rates between ports, and foregone income in 
transit. More potential migrants from more distant eastern and southern Europe could 
now make the move. Furthermore, as industrial revolutions started among the late-comers 
in eastern and southern Europe, the ratio of migration cost to annual income fell even 
more dramatically in those poor parts of Europe. The spread of the transport and the 
industrial revolutions both served to extend the reach of global migration: more potential 
emigrants in the poor rural hinterland of western Europe could make the move, and more 
potential emigrants from distant and backward eastern and southern Europe could make 
the move. Thus, migrant origins shifted to more backward and poorer regions, countries 
that were late-comers to modern economic growth. In addition, as each of these countries 
went through its own emigration life cycle, the share coming from poorer and ethnically 
different countries soared: those coming from the richer parts of Europe, with ethnic 
attributes similar to the native-born, declined in numbers as their emigration life cycle 
was completed; those coming from the poorer parts of Europe, with ethnic attributes 
different than the native-born, rose in numbers as their emigration life cycle began. Thus,   11
the ethnic gap between the native-born and the new immigrant widened in host countries 
and they became culturally and ethnically more diverse. 
  This dramatic shift in immigrant source obeyed economic and demographic laws 
of motion. As I have already noted, the shift in immigrant source induced a rise in host 
country ethnic diversity. It also induced a decline in the quality of immigrants (as judged 
by labor markets) and an even bigger decline in the quality of immigrants relative to the 
native-born (who were increasing their human capital at a fast pace). The fall in 
immigrant quality and the rise in their ethnic ‘distance’ from the host country norm both 
had a great deal to do with rising negative attitudes towards immigration in the US, 
especially the positive interaction between them. These trends helped produce the 1917 
Literacy Act, the Quota Acts of 1921, 1924 and 1927, as well as the ban on Asians 
(Hatton and Williamson 2005: Chp. 9). All of these Acts were consistent with a racist 
policy retreat from ethnic diversity, and they persisted until the immigration reforms of 
1965. Although the US was by far the main destination of European emigrants, other 
labor scarce immigrant countries underwent the same negative response to the rise (or a 
threatened rise) in ethnic diversity: Australia and New Zealand imposed ‘whites only’ 
policies (which persisted until the 1970s and 1980s), and racial strife broke out in tropical 
regions that had been relying on Asian contract labor for almost a century.  
In short, the first global migration century came to an end, and the rising trend in 
host country ethnic diversity ceased. Or so says the conventional historical wisdom. Can 
it be confirmed with quantitative evidence? The US census reports country of birth 
starting with 1850, so I shall use these data to explore the hypothesis. True, country of 
birth isn’t exactly ethnic diversity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005), but it’s a start. I will   12
also use the RQ index that is so common in the literature that explores the impact of 
ethnic diversity on economic growth and public goods expenditure (Esteban and Ray 
1994; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005): 
RQ = 1 – Σ ([0.5 - si]/0.5)
2 si     ( 1 )  
where si is the share of the foreign-born from origin-country i in total foreign-born 
population or in total population. The growth-public goods literature calls this a 
polarization index – reflecting its negative impact, but I will adopt the more benign view 
of migration and call it a diversity index. In any case, RQ reaches a maximum when two 
groups are of equal size and declines as their relative importance deviates: a high RQ 
indicates ethnic diversity. Of course, one would like to weight by the ‘ethnic distance’ 
between groups (e.g. by language and religion), but no such empirical analysis has yet 
been attempted (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005: 794), and the US authorities did not offer 
such judgments (although US native-born citizens certainly did). I will come back to the 
issue of ‘ethnic distance’ since it will shade our interpretation of RQ levels and trends.  
  Table 2 uses the US data on country of birth to construct RQ at census benchmark 
dates 1850-1960, as well as changes in the RQ index over the open, free migration era 
1850-1910 and the closed and discriminatory period 1920-1960. The RQ calculations are 
made according to eight world regions, and the country allocations to those regions are 
given in the Appendix.
8 Table 2 also reports RQ within the foreign-born group (diversity 
among the foreign-born), between the foreign-born and native-born (diversity between 
the two groups), and total diversity. Note the following in Table 2: Total ethnic diversity 
                                                 
8 See Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for the technical reasons why the country data cannot be used with 
some aggregation.   13
reached a peak in 1860 (0.512), which it has not regained since, this despite the fact that 
diversity among the foreign-born was almost at its lowest (0.099). The explanation is that 
the RQ between index (the FB share) was at its peak (0.516).  
Now consider the details, starting with the age of free migration 1850-1910. As 
predicted by the emigration life cycle model, within and total RQ changed far more 
dramatically than did the between RQ index (driven by the FB share). In the half-century 
before 1910, the within RQ rose five times faster than did the between RQ. The United 
States already had a high level of ethnic diversity in 1850 with RQ = 0.401. The 
subsequent rise in US ethnic diversity was driven almost entirely by the increased 
diversity of the immigrants themselves, an event which had important political 
implications, as I have argued. 
Now consider the 1920-1960 period when immigration policy was so restrictive. 
Before WWI, the US did not discriminate against poor source countries (except for the 
ban on Asians after 1882). Between WWI and 1965, the US used quotas to favor west 
Europeans and suppress immigration from poor countries. After the Immigration Act of 
1965, the US leveled the playing field again back to what it was in the first global century 
(except for that post-1982 anti-Asian bias). Total ethnic diversity fell sharply, but its 
main source was the fall in immigration and the FB share (RQ between), not the more 
modest fall in RQ within. This is a bit of a surprise given that the intent of the quotas was 
to exclude ‘new’ source countries from the immigration flow.
9 
  
                                                 
9 It must be said, however, that there was no quota on immigrants from south of the border, and Mexicans 
poured over in very big numbers during the 1920s.   14
Migration and Ethnic Diversity: The Second US Global Century 
 
  Annual immigration to North America and Oceania rose gradually to the mid 
1970s before surging to a million per year in the 1990s. The absolute numbers were by 
then similar to those reached about a century earlier, but they were smaller relative to the 
population and labor force that had to absorb them. Thus, the US annual immigration rate 
fell from 11.6 per thousand in the 1900s to 0.4 per thousand in the 1940s, before rising 
again to 4 immigrants per thousand in the 1990s. The proportion of the US population 
foreign-born had fallen from a 1910 peak of almost 15 percent to an all-century low of 
less than 5 percent in 1970. The postwar immigration boom increased the foreign-born 
share to more than 8 percent in 1990 and more than 10 percent in 2000. Thus, it appears 
that the US has reclaimed the title “a nation of immigrants” after a half-century retreat. 
Has it also reclaimed the title “an ethnically diverse nation” after a half-century of 
retreat? 
As this audience well knows, what happened to the United States after World War 
II also happened world-wide (Table 3). The foreign-born share increased by about a third 
in Oceania between 1965 and 2000 – from 14.4 to 19.1 percent, more than doubled in 
North America – from 6 to 13 percent, and more than tripled in Europe – from 2.2 to 7.7 
percent. Of course, the addition of undocumented immigrants would raise these foreign-
born shares, and perhaps even raise their increase over time. Illegal immigrants will also 
raise the ethnic diversity measures, since they tend to be unskilled from the poorest 
countries, individuals which host country immigration policy tries to keep out. Thus, 
restrictive immigration policy tends to make the social problems associated with ethnic   15
diversity even worse: the larger the share illegal, the bigger the ethnic distance between 
and host country native-born norms.  
While world migration has surged, the labor market quality of these immigrants 
(relative to native-born) has declined as their ethnic ‘distance’ from host country native-
born norms has increased. For example, US immigrant males earned 4.1 percent more than 
native-born males in 1960, but they earned 16.3 percent less in 1990. The wage of 
recently-arrived US immigrants (relative to the native-born) deteriorated by 24 percentage 
points between 1960 and 1990. Although the average educational attainment of US 
immigrants improved, it did not increase as rapidly as that of the native-born. The 
percentage of newly-arrived US immigrants with less that 12 years education was 5.6 
percentage points higher than native-born in 1970, but 20.4 percentage points higher in 
1990, an increase of almost four times. Most of this decline in immigrant relative quality is 
due to changes in the source country composition (Table 4), and, of course, the same is 
true of the rise in ethnic diversity. I think it is important to stress the coincident fall in 
immigrant quality and the rise in ethnic diversity in the recent half-century since that 
combination contributed dramatically to anti-immigration sentiment a century ago. In any 
case, both trends have been driven by four massive shifts in world migration patterns over 
the half century since World War II.  
The first shift involved Europe’s decline as an emigrant source. Part of this drop 
can be explained by the resurgence of migration within Europe (including Turkey): foreign 
European nationals increased from 1.3 percent of the western European population in 1950 
to 10.3 percent in 2000. The rise would have been even higher if it included the foreign-
born that became naturalized. More recently, western and southern Europe have become   16
destinations for immigrants from Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and since the demise of 
the Soviet Union in the 1990s western Europe has also absorbed immigrants from the east 
including the former Soviet republics. As a result, annual net immigration into the 
European Union (EU) has soared since the 1980s such that it now surpasses that of the US, 
and it would exceed it by even more if illegal immigrants were included.  
The second shift involved emigration from Eastern Europe. This traditional east-
west European flow has a long history, but it was stopped cold by postwar emigration 
policy in the centrally planned economies. Things changed dramatically in the 1980s 
when Poland and Romania opened up, and they changed even more dramatically when 
the Berlin Wall fell in November of 1989. Emigration from these transition economies 
increased by five times between 1985 and 1989. The annual outflow stayed at levels 
exceeding a million until 1993, when they eased off a bit. In any case, Europe seems to 
have re-established its old east-west migration tradition. 
The third shift involved the transformation of Latin America from a major 
emigrant destination to a major immigrant source. The emigrant life cycle leads us to 
expect that poor, low-wage and agrarian countries should send out more emigrants as 
they industrialize, but at some point they should start to retain their own and receive 
immigrants as they get fully industrial and high-wage. Latin America is an exception to 
the rule: it went from hosting (net) 1.8 million foreign-born in 1960, to having (net) 1.8 
million of their own hosted abroad in 1980. The explanation for this unique regime 
switch appears to be that Latin America has a much richer and faster growing northern 
neighbor close by.    17
The fourth shift during the post-war decades involved Asian, African and Middle 
Eastern immigrants, whose numbers rose from a negligible to a huge flow. This evolution 
repeats the emigration life cycle experience of the first global century. Early 
industrializations and demographic transitions unleash a surge of emigration as the 
migration poverty trap is unlocked. Thus, the East Asian miracle first fostered an 
emigration surge, the rate of rise then slowed down, peaked, and subsequently declined as 
modern development ensued. The Middle East pattern has been delayed, as has been its 
development. The African pattern has been delayed even longer, as its growth over the 
past half century has been so disappointing. 
Before moving on to the evolution of the RQ index since 1965, I want to stress 
the role of host country immigration policy. To repeat, in the first global century shifts in 
the source country composition were the result of the spread of the industrial revolution, 
rising incomes and demographic transitions in the poorer and more distant parts of 
Europe. That is, demographic booms and early industrial revolutions generated a surge in 
emigration from ethnically different countries, while demographic busts and mature 
industrial revolutions generated a fall in emigration from ethnically similar countries. 
Falling transport costs between sending and receiving regions amplified these forces, as 
did the friends and relatives effect. These forces also slowly reduced positive selection: 
the really poor could finance the move only late in the first global century, as their 
incomes at home rose and as the cost of passage fell. Exactly the same forces have also 
been at work in the modern era although policy has served to strengthen them. In the US, 
these included the abolition in 1965 of the country-of-origin quotas (and Asian bans) that 
had previously favored Europe, the shift to a worldwide quota, and the emphasis on   18
family reunification as a key criteria for admission. Other OECD countries also leveled 
the source-country playing field, but the effects on immigrant composition (and ethnic 
diversity) were not quite as dramatic.  
Now consider US experience with ethnic diversity since 1970 as reported in Table 
5. Note two important facts. In spite of all the debate about US immigration, the total 
ethnic diversity index in 2004 had only recovered its 1940 level, and it is unlikely that 
future levels will recover the peaks attained in the first third of the 20
th century (see Table 
2). The big surprise is that all of the rise in total US ethnic diversity since 1970 has been 
due to rising immigration rates and FB shares. None of the rise has been due to greater 
ethnic diversity among the foreign-born since the within RQ has not risen over the past 
35 years. The surge in immigrants from East Asia and Latin America, then eastern 
Europe and the Middle East, then South Asia, and finally Africa has not left its mark on 
aggregate foreign-born diversity since each of those new sources simply replaced old 
sources. 
While very few EU countries supply long time series on country-of-birth, three 
Scandinavian countries do and they are presented in Table 6. They confirm the US trends. 
Namely, total migrant diversity has risen since 1970 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
but the rise has been driven entirely by increasing FB shares. As with the US, diversity 
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Which Countries Are the Most Diverse? 
 
  Most countries do not report country of birth data, but it is available for eleven 
industrial countries in 2001 plus France for 1990. Table 7 summarizes the data for all 
three RQ measures. 
 The  total migrant ethnic diversity measure is highest by far for Australia (0.598) 
and Canada (0.518), well above the unweighted average of the twelve (0.319). Both 
Australia and Canada recorded a total RQ index above that which the United States 
recorded in 1910 at the height of the free mass migration period (Table 2: 0.482). To the 
extent that observers at that time felt that immigrant assimilation problems were 
sufficiently difficult to warrant the restrictions passed in 1917 and the 1920s, it is all the 
more surprising that Australia and Canada have done so well on that front. Those 
immigrant countries with moderate total ethnic diversity levels in 2001 are Austria 
(0.405), Ireland (0.358), the Netherlands (0.347), France (0.343) and the United States 
(0.319). These figures are roughly comparable to those recorded by the US in 1930 and 
1940 (Table 7: 0.385 and 0.327) after the quotas were in place and after the great 
depression. The big surprise here, given all the rhetoric about the US being a nation of 
immigrants, is that the US figure is at the bottom of the list of moderates, exactly the 
average of the twelve. The lowest total ethnic diversity levels are recorded for Denmark 
(0.208), Finland (0.111), Norway (0.149), Sweden (0.193) and, surprisingly, the United 
Kingdom (0.285). 
 The  within migrant diversity range is much lower across these twelve. Still, 
Australia (0.671), Austria (0.761), Denmark (0.622), Finland (0.729), France (0.688),   20
Sweden (0.658) and the US (0.683) all recorded very high diversity among the 
immigrants themselves. Furthermore, six of these seven countries, the exception being 
Denmark, recorded a higher within RQ figure than did the US in 1910 (Table 7: 0.635), 
including the US itself. The other five – Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and 
the UK – all had lower diversity among the immigrants themselves, but not all that lower 
than the US 1910 figure. The interesting question is how much of this variance is 
explained by policy, and how much by the standard variables that explain migrant 
destination choice.  
The much wider range on between RQ – driven by the foreign-born share – can be 
explained, one supposes, mostly by policy. Except for Australia and Canada, these 
countries had in 2001 (and France in 1990) lower between RQ figures than did the US 
under unrestricted immigration in 1910 (Table 7: 0.508). 
 
Two Concluding Words about the Research Agenda 
 
  My motivation in this paper is to offer measures of migrant diversity that are 
comparable across countries and over time, so that they can be used to assess its impact 
of public attitudes towards immigrants. To that extent, this paper offers only the first step. 
It seems to me that there are two more steps to be taken before the political economy 
analysis can begin in earnest. First, our migrant diversity measure must be made richer by 
assigning the language, religion and other cultural attributes of source countries to 
foreign-born by country of birth. By so doing, it will attach weights to migrants by source   21
given the cultural ‘distance’ they are from the native-born. Second, late 19
th century 
migration backlash was driven by the interaction of rising migrant numbers (between 
RQ), with migrant diversity (within RQ) and the level of skill. Those with low skills 
(below the skills of the native-born median voter) -- controlling for the other two 
dimensions – appeared to face more difficult assimilation problems. To see whether the 
same thing is true today, we need to interact the migrant diversity index with measures of 
skill by country of birth.    22
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Appendix 
 
Eight regions are used in the RQ country-of-birth analysis in Tables 2, 5, 6 and 7. The 
regional allocations are the following: 
 
Northwest Europe and North America 
Canada     Ireland 
St. Pierre and Miquelon      Northern Europe, n.s. 
Atlantic  Islands     Belgium 
North  America,  n.s.     France 
Denmark        Germany 
Finland     Liechtenstein 
Iceland       Luxembourg 
Lapland      Monaco 
N o r w a y       N e t h e r l a n d s  
Sweden     Switzerland 
England      Western  Europe,  n.s. 
S c o t l a n d       A u s t r a l i a  
W a l e s        N e w   Z e a l a n d  
United  Kingdom,  n.s.     Antarctica 
 
Central America, South America, and Caribbean 
  Mexico      Cuba 
Central  America  n.s.     West  Indies 
Caribbean  n.s.      South  America 
 
Southern Europe (5) 
Portugal      Italy 
San  Marino      Vatican  City 
Spain       Southern  Europe  n.s. 
 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  
Austria       Eastern  Europe  n.s.      
Albania     Russian  Empire 
Bulgaria      Baltic  States  n.s. 
Czechoslovakia     Estonia 
Hungary      Latvia 
Poland       Lithuania 
Romania      Other  USSR/Russia 
Yugoslavia      Europe  n.s. 
Central Europe n.s. 
 
East Asia and Pacific 
China       Malaysia 
J a p a n        P a c i f i c   I s l a n d s  
Korea       Philippines 
East  Asia  n.s.      Singapore   25
Brunei       Thailand 
Cambodia  (Kampuchea)    Vietnam 
Indonesia      Southeast  Asia  n.s. 
Laos 
 
South Asia  
Afghanistan      Nepal 
Bangladesh      Pakistan 
Burma  (Myanmar)     South  Asia  n.s.    
Ceylon  (Sri  Lanka)     Maldives 
India 
 
Middle East and North Africa  
B a h r a i n      Q a t a r  
Cyprus       Saudi  Arabia 
I r a n        S y r i a  
Iraq       Turkey  (Ottoman) 
Israel/Palestine    United  Arab  Emirates 
Jordan  Kuwait      Yeman  Arab  Republic 
Lebanon      Yeman  PDR 
O m a n        N o r t h   A f r i c a  
Middle East n.s. 
 
Africa  




                                                  Table 1 
  Determinants of the Foreign-Born Share: The Parsimonious Model 




  Coefficient   
on GDP per 
 Coefficient    
on land area 
Region FB  Mean       capita       (size) 
      
Western Europe/North America  10.07 0.518 0.438 
    0.96 0.75 
Eastern Europe/Central Asia  8.24 0.112 0.218 
    0.26 0.45 
Middle East/North Africa  4.98 0.195 -7.165 
    0.23 -1.16 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.66 0.2 -2.094 
    0.78 -1.14 
East Asia  1.05 0.532 0.938 
    2.21 1.57 
Latin America/Caribbean  1.01 0.621 -0.764 
    3.06 -1.47 
South Asia  0.92 -0.26 -0.44 
    -0.03 -0.78 
      
World  2.98 0.294 0.114 
   3.84 0.41 
      
Notes: The weighted regional foreign-born means are population weighted. The figures 
in italics are t-statistics. 
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                                                                     Table 2   
                     Measuring Migrant Ethnic Diversity in the United States 1850-1960 
              
RQ   1850 1860 1870 1880 1900 1910 1920 1930  1940 1950 1960
              
Within   0.059 0.099 0.137 0.236 0.465 0.635 0.809 0.813 0.807  0.788 0.798
Between   0.402 0.516 0.492 0.464 0.475 0.508 0.463 0.409 0.342  0.232 0.213
Total  0.401 0.512 0.488 0.457 0.461 0.482 0.434 0.385 0.327  0.224 0.208
              
RQ Change         1850-1910             1920-1960     
              
Within     0.576      -0.011    
Between     0.106      -0.251    
Total     0.081      -0.226    
              
Notes: See text. The 1890 census data was absent from the web 
source.       
 







Shares of Foreign-Born in Populations, 1870/1-2000/1 
 
 1870/1  1890/1  1910/11  2000/1 
Europe      
Germany  0.5 0.9 1.9 8.9 
France  2.0 3.0 3.0 10.0 
United  Kingdom  0.5 0.7 0.9 4.3 
Denmark  3.0 3.3 3.1 5.8 
Norway  1.6 2.4 2.3 6.3 
Sweden  0.3 0.5 0.9 11.3 
New World      
Australia  46.5 31.8 17.1 23.6 
New  Zealand  63.5 41.5 30.3 19.5 
Canada  16.5 13.3 22.0 17.4 
United  States  14.4 14.7 14.7 11.1 
Argentina  12.1 25.5 29.9 5.0 
Brazil  3.9 2.5 7.3  
 
Notes: All entries in percent, and Brazil 1910/11 = 1900. Source: Hatton and Williamson (2005: Table 2.2). 
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Table 4 
Source Area Composition of US Immigration, 1951-2000 
(% of total) 
 
Region of Origin  1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90  1991-
2000
   
Europe 
   
52.7
   
33.8
   
17.8
   
10.3 
   
14.9
   
      West 
   
47.1
   
30.2
   
14.5
   
7.2  5.6
   
      East 
   
5.6
   
3.6
   
3.3
   
3.1  9.4
   
Asia 
   
6.1
   
12.9
   
35.3
   
37.3 
   
30.7
   
Americas 
   
39.6
   
51.7
   
44.1
   
49.3 
   
49.3
   
      Canada  
   
15.0
   
12.4
   
3.8
   
2.1 
   
2.1
   
      Mexico 
   
11.9
   
13.7
   
14.2
   
22.6 
   
24.7
   
      Caribbean 
   
4.9
   
14.2
   
16.5
   
11.9 
   
10.8
   
      Central America 
   
1.8
   
3.1
   
3.0
   
6.4 
   
5.8
   
      South America 
   
3.6
   
7.8
   
6.6
   
6.3 
   
5.9
   
Africa 
   
0.6
   
0.9
   
1.8
   
2.4 
   
3.9
   
Oceania 
   
0.5
   
0.8
   
0.9
   
0.6 
   
0.6
   
Total (000's) 
   
2,515
   
3,322
   
4,493
   
7,338 
   
9,095
 
Source: Hatton and Williamson (2005: Table 10.2). 
Notes: National origin based on country of last residence. Totals include 2.7 million former illegal aliens 
receiving permanent resident status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 1986. Of these, 1.3 
million fall in the decade 1981-1990 period and 1.4 million in the decade 1991-2000.    30
 
                                                  Table 5   
         Measuring Migrant Ethnic Diversity in the United States 1960-2004   
           
  RQ   1960 1970 1980 1990 2004   
           
  Within FB  0.798 0.745 0.698 0.717 0.682   
  Between FB and NB  0.213 0.204 0.251 0.298 0.359   
  Total  0.208 0.199 0.243 0.284 0.334   
           
  Change in RQ     1970-2004    
           
  Within FB     -0.063    
  Between FB and NB     0.155    
  Total     0.135    
           
  Notes: See text.   
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                                                     Table 6   
          Measuring Migrant Ethnic Diversity in Scandinavia 1970-2000   
            
   RQ   1970 1980 1990 2000   
       Denmark        
   Within FB               na  0.706 0.686  0.634   
   Between FB and NB               na  0.075 0.113  0.186   
   Total               na  0.087 0.129  0.208   
       Norway        
   Within FB  0.628 0.679 0.619 0.579   
   Between FB and NB               na  0.075 0.128  0.154   
   Total               na  0.074 0.125  0.149   
       Sweden        
   Within FB  0.702 0.721 0.702 0.661   
   Between FB and NB  0.194 0.194 0.211 0.204   
   Total  0.189 0.188 0.203 0.196   
  
Notes: Taken from the MIS web site 
http://www.migrationinformation.org.   
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                                                  Table 7    
       Measuring Migrant Ethnic Diversity Across Countries 2001    
              
   Country RQ Within FB 
RQ Between 
FB and NB   RQ Total   
              
   Australia  0.671 0.711 0.598     
   Austria  0.761 0.438 0.405     
   Canada  0.527 0.611 0.518     
   Denmark  0.622 0.186 0.208     
   Finland  0.729 0.113 0.111     
   France  0.688 0.371 0.343     
   Ireland  0.587 0.373 0.358     
   Netherlands  0.559 0.379 0.347     
   Norway  0.567 0.154 0.149     
   Sweden  0.658 0.201 0.193     
   United  Kingdom  0.592 0.304 0.285     
   United  States  0.683 0.343 0.319     
              
  
Source: MIS web site http://www.migrationinformation.org, except 
for France (1990), from UN web site http://unstats.un.org.    
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